Curve Discloses Fee Theft As Replacement Vote Closes
Curve disclosed on November 17 that an attacker used a missing order check in its CowSwapBurner contract to sell 38,205.76 USDC worth of DAO fee balances on November 10, and DAO vote 1524 on a replacement burner closes on November 20.
Edited and fact-checked by Stephen Sprague
The contract checked the description and skipped the order it belonged to. The replacement vote is about binding those two together.
Seven minutes after the exchange window opened on November 10, a forged order sold Curve's YB balance and paid the attacker. The order carried the signature data of the burner's own genuine YB order, and the CowSwapBurner contract approved the sale without comparing the two. The attacker reused that single attachment 137 more times, and the last forged order settled at 11:10 UTC.
The burner sits in the middle of Curve's weekly fee routine, where Curve collects admin fees from its pools and markets into a FeeCollector and moves them to the burner on Monday. The burner sells the fees during a 24-hour window that opens on Tuesday at 00:00 UTC, and the crvUSD proceeds go out on Wednesday. CoW Protocol validates each order through a function named isValidSignature, and Curve's disclosure prints the defect in one line taken from the code itself. 'The function explicitly ignored _hash,' the disclosure says. The contract checked the order described in the signature data and never checked that the description matched the order about to execute.
Curve's own table separates the week's honest work from the theft with exact figures on both sides. Thirty-six regular orders covering 35 tokens delivered 97,317.74 crvUSD to the FeeCollector as usual, while the 138 forged orders covered 135 tokens and paid 38,205.76 USDC to the attacker. Curve says it checked all 6,558 orders the burner has settled since June 2024 and found no others that paid the wrong address. The forged orders fed on dust, with a median value of about $254 and only two above $500, and the tokens they sold had sat unsold for a median of 161 days because their balances fell below the burner's 500 crvUSD sale minimum.
The exit route took four hours to cross two networks, and Curve traced each hop in its disclosure for anyone to follow. The attacker swapped 37,611.76 USDC into ether, split the funds across four addresses, bridged them to Arbitrum and deposited 37,229.89 USDC into Hyperliquid, where the money bought 65.41 XMR1, a Monero-linked asset that hadn't moved by November 16. On November 15 the attacker swapped the remaining 594 USDC into ether and deposited 0.3 ether into Tornado Cash. Curve states the boundary of the loss plainly in its summary, in four words. 'No user funds were affected,' the disclosure says, because the burner holds admin fees the DAO has already collected, and pools, lending markets and crvUSD stayed outside the incident.
For businesses
Amazon Business is Amazon’s purchasing store for companies, with business accounts and quantity ordering.Register with Amazon BusinessAn external report reached Curve at about 12:40 UTC on November 10, and the Emergency DAO disabled fee collection and exchange on Ethereum at 13:59 UTC that day. The same step followed on Arbitrum and Base at 16:55 UTC as a precaution, and Curve found no forged orders on Arbitrum or Gnosis. On November 17 the Emergency DAO swept the old burners' remaining balances on Ethereum, Base and Arbitrum back to their FeeCollectors, and DAO vote 1524, open since November 13, proposes a replacement burner that sells fees through a descending-price auction and requires the order hash to match the order it checked. The vote closes on November 20. Fee conversion on Ethereum stays paused while fees keep accruing, the stolen revenue hasn't been recovered, and Curve says it warned operators of outside projects that reused the burner code before it published the flaw.
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